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Abstract 
To ensure infrastructure assets are procured and maintained by government on behalf of citizens, appropriate 
policy and institutional architecture is needed, particularly if a fundamental shift to more sustainable infrastructure  
is the goal. The shift in recent years from competitive and resource-intensive procurement to more collaborative 
and sustainable approaches to infrastructure governance is considered a major transition in infrastructure 
procurement systems. In order to better understand this transition in infrastructure procurement arrangements, the 
concept of emergence from Complex Adaptive Systems (CAS) theory is offered as a key construct. Emergence 
holds that micro interactions can result in emergent macro order. Applying the concept of emergence to 
infrastructure procurement, this research examines how interaction of agents in individual projects can result in 
different industry structural characteristics. The paper concludes that CAS theory, and particularly the concept of 
‘emergence’, provides a useful construct to understand infrastructure procurement dynamics and progress 
towards sustainability. 
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Introduction 
Proficient and effective provision and stewardship of physical infrastructure is a key activity of government (Lædre, 
Austeng, Haugen and Klakegg, 2006). A critical part of this process is to first ensure that the assets purchased 
either through purpose-built design, or as ready-made products, are appropriate to both the required task and 
operations, and importantly, to the way that the task or operation should be carried out to support the underpinning 
values of society. Consequently it is crucial to fit within the value framework as espoused by the citizenry and 
government, and state actors need to devise the appropriate policy and institutional architecture for this purpose. 
The institutional arrangements for the effective procurement of engineered infrastructure assets, the way in which 
these arrangements contribute to sustainability of infrastructure assets, and how changes are adjusted and 
adapted over time are the focus of this research. Procurement of infrastructure assets in a way that offers the best 
opportunity to develop the purpose and operation of the asset is an important but often neglected part of the life 
cycle process. We argue that this part of the asset life cycle can be investigated to give insights into the progress 
towards a sustainability agenda. 
 
Infrastructure procurement is outlined as a way to focus on and explicate transition in relation to a more 
sustainable infrastructure system. While sustainability is a concept that resists easy achievement, particularly by 
single firms or policy prescription, the progress towards sustainability, as suggested by Kemp and Loorbach 
(2003) can be assisted by adopting a transition management approach. Transition management, with its locus of 
attention on long-term generational change, is a way of shaping those transformational changes occurring within 
society driven by the values and aspirations of citizens (Rotmans, Kemp, and van Asselt, 2001). It is contended 
that Complex Adaptive Systems (CAS) theory, with its emphasis on how systems are created and recreated by 
ongoing interaction of those agents operating within sets of rules of the system, provides a useful construct to 
understand the dynamics and outcomes of procurement systems at the industry level and infrastructure industry 
dynamics, and to assess the possibilities for managing such transitions towards sustainability. 
 
Transitions, Complex Adaptive Systems and Sustainability  
 
Sustainability in its broadest sense is about progress, through the creation of economic, environmental and social 
capital, towards meeting present development needs and ensuring future development requirements can be met 
(Kemp and Loorbach, 2003). Dasgupta and Tam (2005) acknowledge the difficulty in achieving sustainability for 
infrastructure systems as these are distributed networks over large distances, have impacts that are significant but 
dispersed, and have multiple and often conflicting stakeholders.   
 
Rotmans, Kemp and van Asselt (2001) use a case study of transition to a low emission energy supply in the 
Netherlands to show that transition management may create the trigger to shift to sustainable development, 
however, while the role of public institutions in driving change is acknowledged, the major impetus to change is 
argued to be the citizenry (society). The study by Rotmans, Kemp and van Asselt (2001) indicates that multiple 
and conflicting layers are implicated in the transition to sustainability, but conclude that the social milieu is the key 
to impelling transitions. 
 
This research takes up the theme of managing transitions to a more sustainable future by tracking the changes to 
operations according to new collaborative forms of procurement arrangements. Such fundamental shifts from the 
prior competitive approach to more collaborative arrangements and models of project governance can be viewed 
as a major transition in procurement system arrangements. Further, the appropriateness of two concepts from 
CAS theory — the interaction of agents according to ‘rules’ and the concept of emergence — are examined as a 
possible way to better explain transitions in the procurement of infrastructure within a sustainability framework. In 
its broadest sense, such changes in infrastructure procurement reflect the shift from New Public Management 
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(NPM), with its emphasis on the use of market mechanisms to achieve efficiencies (Hood, 1991), towards more 
collaborative approaches to service delivery, such as those underpinning network governance arrangements 
(Keast ,Brown and Mandell, 2007). It is contended that as traditional forms of procurement in a market context 
resulted in a fragmented industry afflicted by chronic litigation (Dubois and Gadde, 2002), the application of rules 
and the concept of emergence can explain the change to more collaborative forms of procurement. The research 
considers the question: what does CAS theory inform us about how transitions are able to accommodate a focus 
on sustainability? This question is examined by using the study of the change from competitive procurement to 
collaborative procurement regimes. The methodology undertakes an meta-analysis of three cases of infrastructure 
procurement regimes (phases over time) and describes and analyses the change over time to determine the ways 
that agents interact with each other, and the emergent order which results from such interaction.   
 
CAS theory holds that multiple interactions between agents result in structural changes of the system at an 
aggregate level (Dubois and Gadde, 2002, p.630). This concept is particularly relevant for understanding how 
transition to sustainable infrastructure might occur. The change to infrastructure sustainability is a structural 
change that requires the interaction of agents to coalesce around both technical change to achieve sustainable 
physical infrastructure, as well as social change to reflect social values of sustainability as drivers of change. 
Citizens may demand a focus on sustainability and start to act as agents in an infrastructure system to have this 
intent captured in ‘new rules of the game’ such as lowering emissions, carbon offsets, clean technology 
implementation or changes to pollution policy and laws. However, the rules of the system may also be set at the 
strategic level, by government or by overarching governance bodies. The possibility of change to sustainable 
infrastructure is examined in this context. 
 
Klijn and Teisman (2007) argue that the governance system and its environment are constantly changing and that 
complexity theory helps to explain the way that agents, systems and environments interact and produce change. 
In particular we argue the concept of emergence within CAS provides a key theoretical construct to understand the 
aggregate effect that individual project governance arrangements can have upon the structure of specific 
industries, which in turn impact individual projects. Changes in projects then have an effect on the system, 
operating as a feedback loop. Emergence is understood here as the interaction of agents in the system that 
eventually produces a relatively stable macro structure (Holland, 1998; Tang and Youmin, 2006). It is in this area 
of emergence that CAS theory is held to provide a powerful extension to the advances already made by transition 
theory for addressing sustainability as the interaction of agents influencing technological and public values change  
to deliver sustainable infrastructure (Loorbach and van Raak, 2005; Kemp and Rotmans, 2001). 
 
Applying the concept of emergence to transitions in the rules underpinning infrastructure procurement  requires an 
examination of how the interaction between agents involved in individual projects (infrastructure asset 
procurement in this study) influence the structural characteristics of the industry they are in. In order to explain this 
dynamic more fully, first transitions theory and CAS theory within a sustainability context are reviewed, focussing 
particularly on the concepts of emergence and interaction. The utility of emergence as a construct to understand 
changes that project governance arrangements can have at the industry level in infrastructure procurement is then 
demonstrated. Further, it is shown that agents interacting with the rules of the system could produce the conditions 
for new types of infrastructure systems and it is at this juncture that the change to sustainability becomes a 
possible future scenario.  
 
The next section describes and interrogates the concept of CAS. This theoretical concept is outlined and analysed 
for its relevance to infrastructure procurement systems. In following sections the implications of using CAS theory 
for understanding the potential for  a shift to sustainable infrastructure are then explored.   
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Complex Adaptive Systems (CAS) 
CAS theory is derived chiefly from biology and seeks to understand the behaviour of populations of animals on 
given landscapes with Kauffman (1995) and Holland (1998) as key authors. Recently this theory has been 
incorporated into strategic management literature, through organisational ecology (Hannan and Carroll, 1992), and 
into public policy literature (Klijn, 2007). Two elements of CAS theory that are then relevant for the analysis of 
infrastructure and the transition to sustainability are emergence and agent-rule interaction as these relate to 
explaining the way new systems might come into existence, and distinguish among the many interactions in a 
system the genesis and type of rule change that tips the ‘old’ system into a ‘new’ system. The concept of 
emergence is of interest in this research due to the utility of the construct of managing transitions in infrastructure 
procurement. Interaction rules are an important element as these set the parameters according to which agents 
may interact. 
 
According to CAS theorists, the structure of a system results from the interaction of agents according to rules, both 
formal and informal. These rules are devised to provide an overarching framework for the way in which agents 
may interact with each other. This approach is acknowledged by Klijn and Koppenjan (2006, p.143) when they 
argue that institutions in their role of providing stability and rules, are useful for determining behaviour and 
providing a mechanism for co-operation. Smith and Stacey (1997) note that network, hierarchy and market 
governance modes are the main ways that public and private agents interact in public policy systems. Keast, 
Mandell and Brown (2006) argue that in network arrangements agents will interact primarily via rules of 
collaboration; in hierarchical arrangement, agents interact according to rules of control; and in market based 
arrangements agents interact according to rules of competition. Thus the rules of interaction between agents are 
different depending on the dominant governance arrangement which is in place: network, hierarchy or market.  
 
Cilliers (1999, p. 143) explains that order emerges out of interaction according to rules without the intervention of 
external forces on the agents (a process also known as self-organising). The emergence of a higher order 
structure from lower order interaction is held to be one of the key properties of CAS (Holland, 1995). Daneke 
(2005, p. 95) argues that “the primary feature of social systems thinking is its focus on those elements that 
‘emerge’ from the interactions of agents and institutions”. As Rhodes (2003, p. 63) points out “Emergence is the 
term used in CAS theory to describe the phenomena of patterns at a higher level of abstraction that arise from 
interactions among lower level agents”.  Notions of self-organisation have parallels in institutional theory with its 
idea that structures emerge from the interaction of agents as they interpret and use institutional rules (Teisman 
and Klijn, 2008).  Consequently, according to CAS theory, for infrastructure procurement systems, the nature of 
the industry structure arises out of the dominant agent interaction rules. Thus, a different industry structure is likely 
to emerge depending on whether the dominant interaction was based on collaboration, competition or control.  
 
It is important to note, that the rules which govern agent interactions are not static however, and are subject to 
change. Change, or adaptation as it is defined in CAS, occurs due to changes in the environment, the choices of 
agents and often a dynamic feedback between the two. Xi (2006, p. 189) observes that the “capacity for self-
organisation is a property of complex systems which enables them to develop or change internal structure 
spontaneously and adaptively in order to cope with, or manipulate, their environment”. When the environment of 
the system changes, so does the behaviour of agents and as a result, the behaviour of the system as a whole 
such that the system learns and adapts to the new environment (Lewin and Regine, 2003). CAS can also evolve 
over time through the entry, exit and change of agents, as well as changes in the linkages between agents 
(Anderson, 1999).  
 
From a public policy perspective, Klijn and Teisman (2007) note that both the governance system and its 
environment are constantly changing, and argue that CAS theory helps to explain the way that agents, systems 
and environments interact and produce change. Klijn and Koppenjan (2006) also contend that change in 
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institutions is problematic as prior interactions, standpoints and relations of power become embedded in 
institutions. In the case of infrastructure procurement, such rules are interaction rules according to, and governed 
by, the policy arrangements devised by government actors. CAS theory holds that such interaction produces 
change not just within a network, but also in relation to how multiple interactions between agents produce an 
outcome at an aggregate level (Dubois, 2002, p. 630). In other words, if the interaction rules were to change, then 
the higher order structures could also change. It is this area of evolution, emergence and adaptation which CAS 
theory is held to provide a powerful extension to the advances made by network governance (White, 2001).  
 
In summary, agents in complex systems interact according to rules. Over time this interaction results in higher 
order structure. However, the rules are not static and have the capacity to change over time. Changing the rules 
by which agents interact, according to CAS theory, will result in a change in the industry level. In order to foster a 
transition to sustainability, then identifying and altering the way agents interact should result in a change in the 
system which supports the transition to infrastructure sustainability. Before this is explored in more detail, a brief 
discussion of transitions and the relationship between CAS and transitions is needed. 
Complex adaptive systems and transitions 
Transitions in policy arenas are often marked by short periods of radical change, followed by long periods of 
stability known as punctuated equilibrium (Loorbach and van Raak, 2005). Transitions are also often marked by 
concurrent developments in a number of domains or arenas, which can either inhibit or accelerate change in other 
arenas (Martens and Rotmans, 2005). Kemp and Rotmans (2001) determine that a transition is a move from one 
dynamic equilibrium to a new dynamic equilibrium characterised by both speedy and deliberate developments as a 
result of interacting processes, and involves innovation as a key aspect of the societal subsystem. 
 
Like complex systems, transitions are viewed as a multilevel construct. At the macro level is the set of societal 
expectations; the meso level contains patterns of institutions, artefacts, rules and norms assembled and 
maintained to perform economic and social activities; and the micro level comprises the individual specific actors 
(van der Brugge and Rotmans, 2007).  
 
While complex systems are made up of agents interacting according to rules, such interaction results in complex 
and emergent patterns — not all of which can be attributed to the action of any one actor or elements of the 
system (Holland, 1995). van der Brugge and Rotmans (2007, p. 253) argue that regimes are complex adaptive 
systems: “an island of relative stability embedded in a changing landscape and not always capable of adapting 
due to its interdependencies between its actors and artefacts”. However, the multilevel nature of CAS would 
suggest that the interaction at the micro level, according to rules set at the regime level, can affect the macro level 
over time.  
 
According to transition theory, transitional changes do not have a predetermined outcome, but instead have a 
variety of potential outcomes. The transition to stabilisation is “the desired pathway in achieving sustainable 
development. However, the complexity of the interaction processes limits control over societal developments 
which may lead to less desired pathways, such as the lock-in, the backlash or the system breakdown” (van der 
Brugge and Rotmans, 2007, p. 255). While rules are seen as key elements in CAS, they are relatively under-
examined in transitions research. Additionally, the impact of making significant changes to the rules is unlikely to 
be determined beforehand, with a number of possible outcomes from the changes in the rules. The goal of this 
research is to make explicit the system transitions in a particular public policy arena — procurement of engineering 
assets — by focussing on the rules, how these rules change over time and the impact that these changes have on 
the system overall.  
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As noted earlier, within CAS theory, the behaviour of agents is seen to be determined by a collection of rules 
(Holland, 1995). Understanding the rules of a CAS is vitally important as these rules are held to determine agent 
behaviour. Gell-Mann (1994) contends that the capability to create rules distinguishes CAS from other complex 
systems such as galaxies. The first step to understanding the dynamics of a system is to identify the rules which 
underpin how the system operates (Rhodes and MacKechnie, 2003).   
Rules and the challenge of engineering asset procurement 
Rules are an important element of a CAS (Holland, 1995). Rules are devised and then applied by matching a 
given situation to those rules (March and Simon,1993, p.8). From a public policy perspective: 
 
“...making sense of contemporary public administration then, requires and understanding of the complex 
ecology of institutions, actors, rules, values, principles, goals, interests, beliefs, powers and cleavages in 
which it operates” (Olsen, 2005, p. 7). 
 
Holland (1995) contends that rules can be classified into two main types — rules which regulate the action of 
agents and rules about the system itself. This point is supported by Klijn (2006; 2007) suggesting that in public 
policy systems there are rules which focus on the policy arena itself (arena rules), and those which relate to the 
interaction of agents in a system (interaction rules). These two ‘layers’ of rules offer a way of understanding the 
different drivers of change, as change may be affected from the top down through the adoption of arena rules and 
also from the bottom up as part of the interplay of interaction rules.     
 
Since the state is the agency through which the ‘rules of the game’ are established and enforced, the state 
controls to an important extent the institutional environment by determining how agents interact (arena rules) 
(Vanberg and Buchanan, 1986, pp.217-218). However, CAS theory suggests that by changing the interaction 
rules, government can change the way the dynamics of the system create different ordering within the system. 
This aspect is especially interesting for understanding the possible shift to sustainable infrastructure as 
government may choose to devise rules that compel agents to adopt new approaches. For example, in a study of 
sustainable transportation, Patil, Herder and Brown (2010) found that stability of policy environment was a critical 
success factor in adopting alternative fuel for transport, along with availability and cost of new technology.      
 
Two key sets of rules relate to decisions concerning the institutional arrangements (interaction rules) involved in 
delivering the engineering asset and in decisions concerning the project or asset itself (system rules). The 
structure of agents interacting in governmental arenas has been of growing concern to public policy researchers 
— particularly those researching the various modes of governance: hierarchy, network and market (Keast ,Mandell 
and Brown, 2006). Boisot and Child (1999) argue that these different organising arrangements are the main 
mechanisms by which agents in CAS cope with complexity. Markets, hierarchies and networks have been 
acknowledged as the fundamental modes, operating as ‘ideal types’, of interaction between organisations (Rhodes 
and MacKechnie, 2003). As modes of social organisation, these are located at the level of governance and fit 
within Geels’ (2002) conceptualisation of the landscape of systems.  
 
Table 1 provides an overview of these different modes of governance and sets out the interaction framework 
within which each mode operates to best and least effect. 
 
Table 1 Summary of forms of organisational interaction (Adapted from Keast, Mandell and Brown, 2006)  
Relationship to 
Organisational 
Archetypes  
Core 
dimension 
Concept 
of 
working 
Objective  Logic Drawback 
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Market  Competition  Working 
against 
Best cost Competition 
keeps price 
down 
In markets where 
competition is weak 
— leads to 
opportunistic 
behaviour  
Network Collaboration Working 
with  
Best 
relationships 
Collaboration 
reduces conflict/ 
realises complex 
projects 
In situations with low 
complexity — not 
worth the 
establishment costs 
Hierarchy Control  Working 
for 
Best quality, 
certainty  
Control ensures 
quality     
Where outcomes are 
difficult to specify 
and therefore 
measure — control 
difficult to ensure 
 
Hierarchy involves the establishment of vertical chains of accountability and is primarily focussed on control; 
markets involve the exchange of goods and services with competition as the underpinning logic; and networks 
involve various types of negotiated outcomes with collaboration a key logic. Keast, Mandell and Brown (2006) note 
that these are archetypes and in reality a mix of the three modes of governance is typical in a given set of 
arrangements. However, Smith and Stacey (1997) argue that the mix or interaction between the formal (hierarchy) 
and informal (network) systems produces emergent order, which may or may not be in line with the intentions of 
those in authority.  
 
While the notion of networks, markets and hierarchies as modes of governance is not new (Polyani, 1957; 
Rhodes, 1997), recent work has focused on the optimal mix of modes of governance in order to deliver services 
and products (Provan and Kenis, 2008), and the importance of different types of networks for different situations 
(Keast, Brown and Mandell, 2007; Provan and Kenis, 2008) (see Table 2).  However, it is contended that these 
archetypal forms provide fruitful ways of examining interaction in procurement systems.  
 
Table 2 Summary of governance rules and their effect on individual projects (Adapted and extended from Eriksson, 2008; 
Rowlinson, 1999; Boisot and Child, 1999)   
Governance 
Dimension 
Competition Control Collaboration 
Performance criteria 
Speed Low (if all phases are 
tendered) 
High High 
Cost Medium Low High 
Variations Medium – High Low High 
Certainty Medium Medium Low 
Client involvement Low Medium High 
Project phases 
Specification By supplier or client By client Joint specification 
Bid invitation Open bid Closed bid (invitation), 
government delivery 
Negotiated 
process 
Bid evaluation High weight on price High weight on certainty High weight on 
‘soft’ parameters 
Contract Formal comprehensive Formal/government Informal, 
9 
 
trading enterprise incomplete 
Compensation Fixed price Penalty clauses Incentives 
Performance evaluation By the client By the client By the supplier 
Complexity 
Relational and 
cognitive complexity 
Medium Low Medium – High 
Business environment 
complexity 
Best when relatively stable 
(predictable) 
Best when stable (little 
change) 
Best when high 
uncertainty 
Complexity in 
delivering 
infrastructure 
Medium complexity Simple tasks High complexity 
 
According to CAS theory there is a trade-off between the various options that agents can take in their interactions 
(Kauffman, 1993). For example, construction relationships can be characterised as either a low trust competitive 
route or a high trust cooperative route (Korczynski, 1996). However, high trust is likely to have high costs as the 
relationships take longer to develop and there is little to guide the project by way of highly specified contractual 
arrangements. As is shown in Table 2, for organisations, as interaction arrangements move towards collaboration 
they are likely to move away from control and competition. These alternative modes of governing relationships 
involved in the delivery of services can influence the outcome of the network (Klijn and Koppenjan, 2006). Thus 
collaboration in a project that requires a low cost, non-negotiated solution is likely to fail as collaboration entails a 
high cost, negotiated solution suited to situations of high complexity. 
 
Geels (2004) suggests that socio-technical systems form the functional underpinning of social organisation as 
these systems involve interaction of both social and technical infrastructures. In this way, transitions need to 
account for public values as well as technical system aspects. The system rule changes in the procurement of 
assets demonstrate that rules relating to technical aspects are not sufficient to change the behaviour of agents but 
that rules relating to social organisation should also be considered.  
 
The implications for the possibilities of a shift to sustainable infrastructure are that the prevailing governance rules 
and the associated dimensions as outlined in Table 2 can exert considerable influence on the take-up of novel 
ideas or new modes of operation. Collaboration involves higher costs and requires a high level of trust but is 
suitable for situations involving high complexity and uncertainty, in which there is scope for the emergence of 
novel ideas or new modes of operation.  The implementation of sustainable infrastructure may be best attempted 
in this context. Competition and control governance systems achieve lower cost but provide less scope for the 
emergence of novel ideas and new modes of operation. Hence, unless the technology or equipment to move to a 
sustainable future can be procured at a low cost, completion and control governance systems provide little  
impetus to change from the status quo and so limit the possibilities of a shift to sustainable infrastructure.       
 
Procurement of infrastructure 
Before the introduction of New Public Management (NPM) approaches that sought to instil business management 
and the rigor of user pays costing into the processes of government, infrastructure was delivered predominantly by 
in-house labour, with only large and complex projects being outsourced (Furneaux, Brown and Allan, 2008; 
Furneaux and Brown, 2007). Widespread adoption of NPM in Australia resulted in a significant shift to contracting 
out of construction services — the competitive model. 
 
Competitive construction procurement systems   
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For construction projects, the traditional approach to building procurement involved the compulsory competitive 
tendering of each stage of the construction process in an effort to reduce costs. Figure 1 summarises the typical 
relationships in a traditional construction contract. As this figure demonstrates, there is little or no interaction 
between the designer and the builder of the project under such arrangements. In this model, sustainability 
measures could not be introduced unless there is a cost reduction outcome for doing so. There are long lead times 
for addressing sustainability and uncertain positive economic outcomes. While positive social and environmental 
outcomes can accrue to a sustainable model, a values approach will be difficult to implement in a market context 
(Kemp and Loorbach, 2003).  
 
Figure 1 Traditional approaches to procurement  
  
  Legend 
   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Dissatisfaction with traditional market approaches led to experimentation with other forms of contract delivery 
mechanisms — or procurement systems as they became termed.  
 
Collaborative approaches to procurement systems  
Institutional differentiation “whether by contracting-out, public private partnerships or bypassing local government 
for special purpose bodies creates imperatives for interdependent actors to work together” has come to the fore 
(Rhodes, 1997, p. 48).  Alliance forms of contractual relationships are one response; a key distinction between this 
approach and traditional approaches is that all the members of the construction team are involved in the planning 
of the project (Furneaux Tywoniak and Gudmundsson 2010) (see Figure 2).  The involvement of constructors in 
the design phase of the project can provide important early advice on the ‘buildability’ of a given design, and thus 
reduce changes to plans and contracts, therefore eliminating costs and time overruns. Additionally, the 
establishment of the alliance may be through pre-qualified supplier arrangements, or through bids by invitation — 
which together involve a less competitive approach than compulsory competitive tendering.  
 
It is suggested that alliance approaches, with their emphasis on innovation and conflict resolution to achieve 
project goals, may be suited to achieve sustainability as part of an innovative capacity. Table 2 indicated that high 
cost, high trust collaboration that delivered complex projects under conditions of uncertainty may be best placed to 
achieve transition to sustainability as the conditions supported experimentation and tolerated higher risk. If 
transition to sustainability could be achieved at a low cost, however, then market-based approaches could deliver 
this change.   
 
Figure 2 Alliance approaches 
Legend 
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Table 3 summarises the contrasts between traditional and alliance forms of contracts.  
 
Table 3 Comparison of traditional and alliance forms of contracts 
 
Procurement system  Traditional Alliance 
Level of competition initially Typically high  Low to Medium  
Level of collaboration once 
the contracts are awarded 
Low High  
 
Impact of competition or collaboration interaction rules on market structures 
 
In the work of Rosenkopf and Schilling (2007), 32 network industries were categorised into different types of 
networks based upon the network structure. Some networks were disconnected with very low connectivity and 
small size; a second type of network, termed hybrid, had medium levels of density with clusters of nodes 
identifiable; and finally spider webs were defined by their high network connectivity and large size (Rosenkopf and 
Schilling, 2007). This study demonstrated that industries have different network structures, although the causes of 
these differences were not established.  
 
Researchers have begun to argue that procurement can have a positive or negative effect on collaboration at an 
industry level (Eriksson, 2008; Eriksson and Pesämaa, 2007). Historically, the construction industry in Australia 
and the UK are considered highly fragmented or loosely coupled industries, often characterised by extensive 
litigation and high dispute resolution costs. Dubois and Gadde (2002) have argued that the causes of such 
fragmentation at the market level results directly from competitive, market-driven procurement policies. Over time, 
the ongoing interaction rules of competition, and conflict would reduce the ties both between industry firms 
delivering the projects and government undertaking such purchasing. From a CAS perspective, the competition 
and conflict which resulted from compulsory competitive tendering arrangements would explain the fragmentation 
and loose coupling at and industry level. The traditional project delivery system is thus a highly competitive 
process that offers little room for consideration of sustainability issues. 
 
An example of the emergence of aggregate order from micro interactions can be seen from the phases of 
procurement in the construction industry in Australia.  
 
Phase 1 — Contracting out 
Following widespread implementation of contracting out in Australia, much of the contracting of construction work 
by government was awarded on the basis of lowest price achieved through competitive tendering of each stage of 
the construction project (design, construction, maintenance). The procurement rules were based on lowest price 
(cost criteria) and the interaction rules were primarily based on competition (in order to achieve lowest price) 
(Furneaux, Brown and Allen 2008). According to Masterman (1992) this pursuit of lowest cost via high levels of 
competition was the predominant method of procurement for most of the 20th century. Dubois and Gadde (2002) 
found that the construction industry is highly fragmented as a result of the highly competitive nature typical of 
procurement approaches. High competition, lowest price procurement resulted in fragmentation and litigation at an 
industry level.  
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Phase 2 — Increased collaboration and increased non-market contract requirements  
The fragmentation and dissatisfaction with outcomes in the competitive model of procurement led to changes to 
the rules under which contracts were undertaken with a move to a more collaborative approach to procurement 
particularly with the introduction of more collaborative forms such as alliances. At the same time, government 
began to introduce a number of additional requirements to procurement contracts in order to achieve multiple 
policy outcomes. These outcomes included policies such as training for Indigenous people, developing public art 
and regional development through local purchasing requirements (Austen et al., 2007), as well as Occupational 
health and Safety (OH&S) compliance systems (Furneaux, Brown and Allan, 2008). These requirements could be 
expanded to include sustainability measures as part of a government policy regime for contracting. The emergent 
quality of these new initiatives indicates that policy prescriptions can be adapted to achieve non-market or social 
purposes and thus align with public values. These can operate to steer the transition to sustainable development.  
 
However, while the fragmentation of a highly competitive market driven industry was addressed through 
collaboration, there may be unintended outcomes of the shift to these more collaborative approaches to 
procurement. Since the introduction of collaborative forms of contracting, together with the increasing social 
requirements required of contractors in all forms of contract in addition to the actual construction process, there 
has been a reduction in bids received to undertake construction work in Australia (Austen et al., 2007). Table 4 
shows this dramatically:  
 
Table 4 – Reduction in the number of bids for construction Austin 2007 p. 62    
 
Prequalification Financial LevelAmount Decline in average # of tender bids
Level 0 $1 to$149,000 22.90% 
Level 1 $150,000 to $750,000 50.20% 
Level 2 $750,001 to $1,500,000 56.40% 
Level 3 $1,500,001 to $3,000,000 60.40% 
Level 4 $3,000,001 to $7,500,000 56.40% 
Level 5 $7,500,001 and above 26.20% 
 
Phase 3 — ‘Managing’ markets   
A reduction in the number of suppliers has a significant consequence for costs in procurement (Furneaux ,Brown 
and Allan, 2008). The increasing reliance of government on a limited number of suppliers increases the potential 
for opportunism in bidding, significantly due to low contestability (Globerman and Vining, 1996). This appears to be 
already happening in Australia, with significant increases in infrastructure costs due to the high demand for 
construction services and the relatively small pool of available workers and construction firms with capability to 
undertake the work (Furneaux, Brown and Allan, 2008).  
 
However, if the emergent outcome of agents interacting in a highly competitive and non collaborative manner is a 
highly fragmented industry, then the outcome of low initial  competition and high collaboration during a project may 
be a more tightly coupled industry. In loosely coupled systems change is difficult to effect due to the lack of 
connectivity between agents. In tightly coupled systems change can be difficult to effect due to ‘lock in’ effects of 
strong relationships which resist change. While loosely coupled systems are high in diversity and result in a lack of 
consistency, tightly coupled systems can be characterised with strong institutional isomorphism, as Di Maggio and 
Powell (1983) argued.  
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A summary of the changes to the rules of the system, the immediate effect on the project and the longer-term 
impact on the market is noted in Figure 3 below.  
 
Figure 3 Effect of changes to rules on projects and market  
Changes to the rules Affect on projects Aggregate affect on the market over 
time 
   
In-house delivery of public 
works 
Major contracts only put to market Separation of public and private 
 
   
 
Shift to market based 
delivery of public works 
(NPM) 
 
 
Lowest price pursued 
 
Compulsory competitive tendering 
Increase in number of suppliers 
bidding for government contracts 
   
 
Introduction of a number of 
additional outcomes and 
performance criteria which 
became delivered through 
procurement 
 
 
Increased requirements on what is 
expected from public works contracts 
(e.g. apprenticeship completions, 
OH&S) 
 
 
Reduction in suppliers bidding for 
government contracts 
   
 
Shift to best value in 
procurement 
 
Reduction in suppliers results in 
shift to more collaborative 
approaches to procurement 
Need to manage the market and 
relationships 
 
 
With the rigidity of tightly coupled systems, one of the largest issues of concern is the possibility of a shock moving 
through the whole system. The transition from a loosely coupled system to a more tightly coupled system is a 
transition process that  needs to be managed as there is potential for significant negative outcomes if a major 
player fails. Thus both a tightly coupled system and a loosely coupled system have effects that need to be 
accounted for in different ways. An industry comprised of a mix of strong and weak ties (one which is neither 
tightly coupled, nor loosely coupled) could offer the best solution, although maintaining the balance between may 
not be achieved easily. According to Rhodes (1997) these networked relations and structures require a mix of 
approaches to be successful.  
 
Conclusion  
This study extends previous work by positing that the interaction between firms involved in procurement activities 
has an effect on the structure of populations of organisations and that actors such as government can either shape 
the landscape or become actors in the interaction. The study investigated the way in which changes in 
procurement rules influence the system level within the construction industry. It was found that interaction between 
actors involved in procurement activities results in the emergence of structure at the population level. The 
research has addressed the question of the way in which the interaction of agents according to rules in 
procurement systems has resulted in the emergence of aggregate order in the system. Although the study has 
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focused on understanding how the procurement of infrastructure assets has changed and is relatively small-scale 
in terms of a transition, the significant shifts in the outlined three phases demonstrate through the depth and 
breadth of change, these examples can be considered as a transition. The use of an example to illustrate and 
explore system change in infrastructure procurement does not directly inform our knowledge about sustainability. 
However decisions and actions in infrastructure procurement that cause change in the way agents interact within 
the system and in response to policy from government and this has a macro effect on the industry as a whole. This 
in turn suggests that changes in the interaction rules can also result in changes at a system level, particularly in 
order to promote the sustainability agenda.     
 
Transitions occur over a long time period, as outlined by Kemp and Rotmans (2001), but transitions also relate to 
the constant adjustment of rules and consequences of decisions taken in the short-term. The conceptualisation 
advanced in this research assists in developing a coherent approach to the management of transitions, as it 
acknowledges the emergent effects of agent interactions according to rules. Critical to the possibility of a shift to 
more sustainable infrastructure is the shaping of arena rules by governance bodies, especially state actors. These 
rules however, are not the only drivers of order within a given system. Results from the case study show that 
changes to a non-market, in-house system to a market based system of procurement by government, driven by 
the intention to develop robust competition between suppliers in a market, actually reduced the number of agents 
vying for procurement contracts. The low number of ‘competitors’ tendering for delivery of infrastructure to 
government found in phase two shows that emergent order can be created by agents organising within a system 
rather than being driven by the arena rules of market-based contracting. However, systems also evolve in 
response to overarching frameworks of these arena rules such that in-house procurement shifted to market-based 
procurement and then to collaborative procurement. However, both actions and decisions emanating from arena 
rules and interaction rules may result in unintended consequences and Complex Adaptive Systems theory assists 
in our understanding of the unpredictability of system change to achieve intended outcomes. Further,  and 
contrary to expectation about the identity and location of agents in initiating change, these shifts were not found to 
be driven entirely by society and the value choices of citizens but also by broader forces at the governance level.     
 
From the findings of the examples given here, it is evident that changing the rules of the system can affect the 
system in significant and sometimes unforeseen ways. In order to manage the emergent effects of transitions in 
the interaction rules, the consequences of such changes need to be monitored, and the resulting structure of the 
industry assessed. Changes to rules in procurement have highlighted the way in which rules and emergence in 
procurement may offer insights into developing a sustainable future for infrastructure. Changes to the interaction 
rules are likely to result in changes to the nature of individual projects, which over time can result in changes to the 
structure of industries. The third phase shift in procurement demonstrated that in volatile times characterised by 
ambiguity and highly complex procurement projects, more collaborative approaches were instigated to find 
mechanisms to deliver successfully these large-scale projects. The action of agents in the system developed rules 
to build high trust and find new ways to interact based on contracts that were not highly prescriptive and not 
focused on low cost budgetary regimes. These conditions may offer a way to understand the requirements for a 
transition to sustainability as sustainability without appropriate low-cost technological solutions will require the 
creation of a high trust environment and understanding of contested and ambiguous contextual space.   
 
New collaborative forms of procurement arrangements are becoming increasingly prevalent. Such fundamental 
shifts from competitive to more collaborative approaches to project governance can be viewed as a major 
transition in procurement system arrangements and can pave the way for sustainability given the combination of 
values and relational principles of trust and mutuality embedded in such frameworks. However, just as traditional 
forms of procurement resulted in unexpected outcomes for the industry, the change to more collaborative forms of 
procurement is unlikely to result in totally embracing a sustainability agenda. Nevertheless it may provide a way of 
understanding the shifts required to develop this agenda. It is here that the concept of emergence provides a 
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useful construct to understand the dynamics and outcomes of procurement systems at the level of organisational 
field or industry level and contribute to our understanding of governability of system transitions towards 
sustainability.  
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